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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH C. V. FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
KAY D. JENKINS, 
Defendant, 
and 
WILLIAM E. MEEKS AND JOR-
JANNA I. MEEKS, his wife, 
Intervenors and Third Party 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
UTAH C. V. FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION and GOLDEN W. ROBBINS, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF INTERVENORS AND 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants' Statement of the Nature of the Case is 
Case No. 
13611 
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inconsistent with the facts and Respondents amend the 
statement to read as follows: 
This case involves a judgment lien. The judgment 
was obtained by plaintiff Utah C. V. Federal Credit Union 
(Credit Union) and became a lien upon a house and lot 
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, then owned 
by defendant Kay D. Jenkins (Jenkins). The judgment 
was satisfied by plaintiff and the satisfaction was duly 
entered by the Clerk of the Court on the docket of the 
judgment. While the judgment was satisfied and dis-
charged, Jenkins sold the property to a third party 
Wallace C. Belnap and Carol J. Belnap, his wife, (Bel-
naps) who later sold the property to Respondents. 
Subsequent to the purchase by Respondents the Satis-
faction of Judgment was vacated by the Court and the 
judgment was reinstated. Execution was issued to sell the 
property to satisfy the judgment which was then owned 
and occupied by Respondents as their home. Respondents 
applied for Intervention in the case and got a temporary 
injunction restraining the sale of their house and lot by 
plaintiff, his attorney and the Sheriff. Respondents claim 
they own title to the property free and clear of the judg-
ment lien because the judgment was satisfied and dis-
charged and did not constitute a lien at the time they 
purchased the property, and they were innocent pur-
chasers, for value, without notice of the judgment lien, 
actual or constructive. Appellants claim the Satisfaction 
of Judgment was invalid because it was not verified and 
was not signed by plaintiff's attorney. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents were allowed to intervene and file a 
quiet title action to quiet their title against the alleged 
liens of Appellants, which was granted. Robbins filed 
Counterclaim against Respondents for attorney fees for 
defending intervention, injunction and quiet title action, 
which was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the Trial Court's judgment 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondents William E. Meeks and Jorjanna 
I. Meeks, his wife, (Meeks) submit the following state-
ment of facts to supplement those set out in the Appel-
lants' Brief which are not complete and wholly consistent 
with the record. The Respondents will be referred to in 
this brief as "Respondents" or "Meeks". The Appellants 
Utah C. V. Federal Credit Union, a corporation, and 
Golden W. Robbins, will be referred to as "Appellants" 
or "Credit Union" and "Robbins" respectively. 
The facts of this case are set forth in Credit Union's 
Judgment by Default filed November 21, 1967 (R. 6), 
Satisfaction of Judgment filed December 31, 1969 (R. 
15), Motion to Set Aside Satisfaction of Judgment filed 
May 14, 1970 and the mailing certificate affixed thereto 
(R. 16), Affidavit of Robbins filed May 14, 1970 (R. 17, 
18), Robbins' Attorney's Claim for Lien filed May 14, 
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1970 (R. 19), Order Setting Aside and Vacating Satisfac-
tion of Judgment filed May 26, 1970 (R. 20), Execution 
(R. 47), Notice of Levy (R. 48), Proof of Publication (R. 
49), Sheriff's Real Estate-Execution Cancelled filed July 
14, 1970 (R. 50), Respondents' Motion to Intervene as a 
Defendant filed June 26, 1970 (R. 21), Respondents' Mo-
tion for Relief from Judgment filed June 26, 1970 (R. 28-
30), Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining 
Order filed July 1, 1970 (R. 32), Respondents' Notice of 
Hearing on Motion to Intervene as Defendant filed June 
26, 1970 (R. 31), Credit Union's Objections to Time of 
Hearing on Motion to Intervene as Defendant filed July 
3, 1970 (R. 37), Credit Union's Objection to Form of 
Bond and Notice for Sureties to Justify filed July 3, 1970 
(R. 36), Credit Union's Motion Pertaining to Order to 
Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order filed July 
6, 1970 (R. 43), Respondents' Notice of Substitution of 
Bond filed July 16, 1970 (R. 51), Respondents' Notice of 
Hearing on Motion to Intervene as Defendant filed Sep-
tember 3,1971 (R. 56), Credit Union's Notice of Hearings, 
Motions and Demands filed September 13, 1971 (R. 60, 
61), Order of Judge Stewart M. Hanson filed September 
17, 1970, granting Respondents' intervention and right to 
file Motion for Relief from Judgment or other pleading 
to put the validity of the judgment hen against Respon-
dents' house and lot at issue (R. 62, 63), Credit Union's 
Motion to Reconsider filed September 17, 1971 (R. 64), 
Credit Union's Motion and Notice of Hearing filed Sep-
tember 22, 1971 (R. 65), Order of Judge Stewart M. 
Hanson filed October 1, 1971, giving Credit Union oppor-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tunity to file Brief and Respondents a Responsive Brief 
(R. 67), Respondents' Motion for Relief from Judgment 
filed September 27, 1971 (R. 74-76), Credit Union's An-
swer to Motion for Relief from Judgment and Motion 
filed September 30, 1971 (R. 68-70), Counter Affidavit of 
Robbins filed September 30, 1971 (R. 71), Credit Union's 
Objection and Motion filed October 7, 1971 (R. 81), 
Order of Judge Stewart M. Hanson Granting Intervenors' 
Motion to Intervene and Denying Plaintiff's Motion to 
Quash filed February 1, 1972 (R. 83, 84), Credit Union's 
Objections to Order Granting Intervenors' Motion to In-
tervene and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash dated 
February 3, 1972 (R. 85), Credit Union's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Notice of Hearing filed August 
18, 1972 (R. 87), Respondents' Notice of Hearing on In-
tervenors' Motion for Relief from Judgment filed August 
24,1972 (R. 88) and Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Notice of Hearing filed August 24,1972 (R. 89, 90), Min-
ute Entry of Order of Judge Mark Johnson, dated Sep-
tember 1% 1972 (R. 91), Minute Entry of Order of Judge 
Earl Marshall, dated September 15, 1972 (R. 92) and 
Order of Judge Earl Marshall filed September 25, 1972 
denying parties Motions for Summary Judgment and 
granting Respondents' Motion to file a Responsive Plead-
ing filed September 25, 1972 (R. 103), Respondents' Mo-
tion to Reconsider and Objections to Order filed Septem-
ber 25,1972 (R. 96-98), Credit Union's Notice of Hearing 
and Motion to Strike filed September 27, 1972 (R. 105), 
Respondents' Notice of Hearing on Intervenors' Motions 
to Reconsider and Objections to Order and for Extension 
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of Time to file Pleadings filed September 25, 1972 (R. 
106), Minute Entry of Order of Judge Joseph A. Jeppson 
dated October 2, 1972 ordering Intervenors are not re-
strained from pleading any particular issue or joining any 
person (R. 109), Respondents' Motion to Bring in Third 
Party Defendant and to File Third Party Complaint and 
Notice filed September 29, 1972 (R. 110, 111), Credit 
Union's Motion to Strike Intervenors' Motion to Bring 
in Third Party Defendant and to File Third Party Com-
plaint filed October 10, 1972 (R. 115, 116), Minute Entry 
of Order of Judge Joseph G. Jeppson granting Respon-
dents' Motion to file Third Party Complaint and to bring 
in Appellant Robbins as Defendant and none other dated 
October 12, 1972 (R. 131), Respondents' proposed Order 
prepared for signature of Judge Joseph G. Jeppson, filed 
October 18, 1972 (R. 133) and Notice filed October 18, 
18, 1972 (R. 132), Credit Union's Objections to Respon-
dents' proposed Order dated October 13, 1972 (R. 134), 
Minute Entry of Judge Joseph G. Jeppson's Order dated 
October 16, 1972, staying the Court's Order dated October 
12, 1972 (R. 137), Brief of Intervenors in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Intervenors' Motion to Bring 
in Third Party Defendant and to file Third Party Com-
plaint filed October 26, 1972 (R. 138-139), Final Order of 
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson dated December 5, 1972 (R. 
150, 151), Credit Union's Objections to Proposed Order 
filed December 5, 1972 (R. 156, 157), Respondents' Third 
Party Complaint filed December 5, 1972 (R. 152), Rob-
bins' Objections, Defenses and Answer to Third Party 
Complaint and Counterclaim filed December 26, 1972 
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(R. 161-164), Credit Union's Objections, Defenses and 
Answer to Third Party Complaint filed December 26, 
1972 (R. 165-167), Respondents' Reply to Coimterclaim 
of Third Party Defendant Golden W. Robbins filed Janu-
ary 5, 1973 (R. 168-171), Respondents' Motion to Strike 
Third Party Defendant's Golden W. Robbins' Objections, 
Defenses and Answer to Third Party Complaint and 
Counterclaim filed January 5, 1973 (R. 172-173) and 
Motion to Strike Third Party Defendant's Utah C. V. 
Credit Union's Objections, Defenses and Answer to Third 
Party Complaint filed January 5, 1973 (R. 174), Respon-
dents' Supplemental Reply to Coimterclaim of Third 
Party Defendant Golden W. Robbins filed January 8, 
1973 (R. 176-179), Intervenors and Third Party Plain-
tiff's Statement of Points and Authorities dated Novem-
ber 15, 1973 (R. 182-190), the Transcript, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
On November 21, 1967 Appellant Credit Union ob-
tained judgment by default against Defendant Jenkins 
for $884.30 with interest at 8% per annum $270.00 attor-
ney's fees and $20.00 costs (R. 6, Ex. TPP 1 and 21, p. 
25). The judgment was duly docketed by the Clerk of 
the Court in the judgment docket of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on November 24,1967 
in Book 104 at Page 1080 (Ex. TPP 3, R. 284-286). 
At the time Defendant Kay D. Jenkins and Nadene 
Jenkins, his wife, were owners of record, as joint tenants, 
of the house and lot located at 4211 Finair Drive, Granger, 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, described as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
All of Lot 14, Fairlane Heights Subdivision ac-
cording to the official plat filed in Book "R" of 
Plats at Page 10, Records of Salt Lake County, 
Utah (5V-85-89; TPP Ex. 21, p. 19). 
This property is the subject matter of this litigation. 
On November 21, 1968, Defendant Jenkins was ad-
judged bankrupt in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division and on April 25, 
1969 the Trustee in Bankruptcy, upon Order of the Court, 
disclaimed any interest in and to the property (Ex. TPP 
21, p. 26-27). 
By Warranty Deed dated September 30,1969, Defen-
dant Kay D. Jenkins and Nadene Jenkins, his wife, con-
veyed the property to Third Party Wallace J. Belnap and 
Carol C. Belnap, his wife, who resided in Phoenix, Ari-
zona (R. 280, Ex. TPP 21, p. 31), said Deed being duly 
acknowledged before one Reed Davis, a Notary Public on 
said date. The Deed was duly recorded on March 17, 
1970 in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah (R. 281, 282, Ex. TPP 21, p. 31, 
McDermaid dep. p. 4). 
On September 30, 1969, Belnaps listed the property 
for sale with West Crest Realty of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
as their agent for $31,500.00. One Reed Davis, a Realtor, 
was proprietor of West Crest Realty and one Brig Young 
was a salesman (R. 279-281, Ex. TPP 6, 7). 
On December 1, 1969, Belnaps contracted to sell and 
Respondents contracted to purchase the property by 
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Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase for 
$29,500.00, payable according to the terms thereof (Ex. 
TPP 6, R. 278-281). The contract was signed by Brig 
Young for and on behalf of West Crest Realty as broker, 
and it provides for Seller Belnaps to pay West Crest 
Realty a real estate commission for procuring the pur-
chaser (Ex. TPP 6, R. 278-281). 
McGhie Land Title Company of Salt Lake City, Utah 
did the abstracting and title work on the property to close 
the sale at the request of West Crest Realty as agent of 
the Belnaps (R. 324-333, 348, 349). 
On December 31, 1969, Appellant Credit Union filed 
in this case a written document duly executed by the 
Credit Union, entitled "Satisfaction of Judgment" Civil 
#175524, whereby the Credit Union acknowledged "the 
within matter having been fully settled and satisfied, the 
following officer of said company, Kurt Vollert, does 
hereby authorize and direct the Clerk of said County of 
Salt Lake, to enter full satisfaction of record of the judg-
ment heretofore recorded. Dated this 31st day of De-
cember, 1969" signed Kurt Vollert Asst.-Treasurer (Ex. 
TPP 2, R. 15). 
On December 31, 1969, the Satisfaction of Judgment 
was duly entered on the docket of the judgment, duly wit-
nessed by the Clerk of the Court (Ex. TPP 3, 21, p. 30, 
R. 275, 284-286). 
On March 13, 1970, Reed Davis or Brig Young of 
West Coast Realty directed Respondents to McGhie Land 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Title Company for the closing of the sale from Belnaps 
to Respondents (R. 289-291) and the sale was closed by 
McGhie Land Title Company on that date (Ex. TPP 
11, R. 324-329). 
On March 13, 1970, Respondents made payment of 
the purchase price of $29,500.00 as stated in a Buyer's 
Escrow Statement dated March 13, 1970 (Ex. TPP 11, R. 
293) i.e. $5,175.00 down payment (Ex. TPP 8, 9, 10, R. 
293-294) credit of $6,000.00 for assignment of equity on 
Huntington contract (Ex. TPP 11, McDermaid Dep. Ex. 
p. 1, R. 294) credit for note and second mortgage on prop-
erty in favor of Belnaps for $8,746.85 (Ex. TPP 11, 13, 14, 
R. 294) credit for assumption of mortgage on property 
to Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association for 
$9,578.15 (Ex. TPP 11, 15, 19, R. 294) and check for 
$817.29 (Ex. TPP 12, P. 294, 327-329). 
On March 17, 1970 Belnaps conveyed the fee title to 
the property to Respondents by Quit Claim Deed dated 
January 2, 1970, which was duly recorded on March 17, 
1970 in the County Recorder's Office for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Respondents have occupied the 
property ever since as their home.(£x7fffi3j ^ / / ^ - ^ v 
On May 14, 1970 two months after Respondents re-
ceived title to the property from Belnaps, more or less, 
Appellant Credit Union filed a Motion to Set Aside the 
"Satisfaction of Judgment" filed in these proceedings on 
December 31, 1969 (R. 16, Ex. TPP 2(a)). Appellant 
Robbins also filed an affidavit in support of the Motion 
wherein he admits Respondents were living in the house 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that is the subject matter of this litigation, and that he 
didn't know the address of defendant Jenkins (R. 17,18). 
On May 14, 1970 Robbins attempted to perfect his 
attorney's lien against Respondents' property by filing in 
the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office, State of Utah, a 
document entitled "Attorney's Claim for Lien" (R. 19, 
Ex. TPP 4). 
All three documents contain a mailing certificate 
certifying copies were mailed to Defendant Jenkins c/o 
Respondents at 4211 Finair Drive, Granger, Utah (Em-
phasis added). 
On May 26,1970, more than two months after Respon-
dents purchased the property, the Satisfaction of Judg-
ment was set aside and vacated (R. 20). A copy was 
mailed to Defendant Kay D. Jenkins, c/o Respondents 
at 4211 Finair Drive, Granger, Utah (Emphasis added). 
It is noted no attempt was made to serve Jenkins per-
sonally even though Robbins admitted in his affidavit he 
knew Jenkins no longer lived at the Finair Drive address, 
nor was any attempt made by the Appellants to join Re-
spondents as Defendants at the time the Motion to Set 
Aside the Satisfaction of Judgment was filed, even though 
Robbins admitted he knew Respondents owned the prop-
erty (R. 17, 18). 
On or about June 1, 1970 Appellant Credit Union 
caused a Writ of Execution to be issued and levy to be 
made upon the property of Respondents by filing a No-
tice of Levy with the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
County, State of Utah on June 4, 1970 and caused the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County to schedule the property to 
be sold at Public Sale on June 30, 1970 by posting a No-
tice of Sale on Respondents' house and otherwise giving 
notice, in accordance with the execution laws of this state. 
(R. 47, 48, 49, 50, Ex. TPP 5, R. 305, 306). On or about 
June 3, 1970 Respondents received envelopes in the U. S. 
Mail from Appellants, some of them addressed to Defen-
dant Jenkins. These envelopes were marked by Mrs. 
Meeks upon receiving them: "Mr. Jenkins was not at 
that address — return to sender" and she put them back 
in the mail. One envelope was turned over to McGhie 
Land Title Company (R. 307, 308 Ex. TPP 23). 
On June 26, 1970 Respondents filed a Motion to In-
tervene in the case. An Order to Show Cause and Tem-
porary Restraining Order was issued by the Court and 
served on the Credit Union, its attorney and the Sheriff, 
restraining the sale of Respondents' house and lot at 
Public Sale set for June 30, 1970 (R. 21, 32). 
On September 17, 1971 the Court entered an Order 
granting Respondents' Motion to Intervene, continued the 
restraining order and permitted Respondents to file a 
Motion for Relief from Judgment, or other pleading, 
that would put before the court for determination whether 
the judgment constituted a valid and enforceable lien 
upon the property (R. 62, 63). 
On September 17, 1971 the Credit Union filed a Mo-
tion to Reconsider (R. 64). 
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On February 1, 1972 the Court re-affirmed its Order 
Granting Intervention to Respondents and authorized 
Respondents to Adopt the Motion for Relief from Judg-
ment theretofore filed, or to otherwise plead, to place 
before the Court for determination the right of the Credit 
Union to sell Respondents' home at Sheriff's Sale, or 
otherwise (R. 83, 84, 74, 75). 
On December 5, 1972, after numerous hearings on 
motions, the Court granted Respondents' Motion to file 
a Third Party Complaint against Appellants to quiet Re-
spondents' title to the property against the alleged liens 
claimed by both Appellants (R. 150-151). The Third 
Party Complaint was duly filed on December 5, 1972 (R. 
152-153) and the Appellants filed Answers thereto with 
Robbins counterclaiming for attorney's fees (R. 161-167). 
Respondents denied the Counterclaim and filed a Supple-
mental Reply thereto (R. 176-179). 
On November 16,1973 the case was tried in the Third 
Judicial District Court before the Hon. James S. Sawaya 
who awarded judgment for Respondents and held: 
"that Mr. and Mrs. Meeks became owners of 
the fee title to the property in question at a time 
when the satisfaction of judgment was on file 
and before the satisfaction had been vacated 
and the judgment reinstated. The Court believes 
the Meeks could rely on the record as it existed 
at the time of purchase and were Bona Fide Pur-
chasers for value and without notice, actual or 
constructive, of the purported hens of Third 
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Party Defendants. In addition, the satisfaction 
had been entered upon the docket by the clerk 
and pursuant to URCP 58B(d) ceased to be a 
lien until the satisfaction was vacated and that 
the claimed liens would not then attach for the 
reason that the fee title was no longer in the 
judgment debtor but had become vested in the 
Meeks. 
Upon the foregoing reasons it is the order 
and judgment of the Court that neither third 
party defendant has any claim, interest or valid 
judgment or attorney's lien upon the property 
in question at the present time and they are 
permanently enjoined from executing upon said 
property in satisfaction of the judgment of plain-
tiff against defendant. No cause of action on 
counterclaim'' (R. 225, 201, 229, 234). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT RESPONDENTS BECAME OWNERS 
OF THE FEE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY 
IN QUESTION AT A TIME WHEN THE 
SATISFACTION WAS ON FILE AND BE-
FORE THE SATISFACTION HAD BEEN 
VACATED AND THE JUDGMENT REIN-
STATED; THAT RESPONDENTS COULD 
RELY ON THE RECORD AS IT EXISTED 
AT THE TIME OF PURCHASE AND WERE 
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE 
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AND WITHOUT NOTICE, ACTUAL OR CON-
STRUCTIVE, OF THE PURPORTED LIENS 
OF APPELLANTS; THAT THE SATISFAC-
TION HAD BEEN ENTERED UPON THE 
JUDGMENT DOCKET BY THE CLERK 
AND PURSUANT TO URCP 58B (d) 
CEASED TO BE A LIEN UNTIL THE SAT-
ISFACTION WAS VACATED; THAT THE 
APPELLANT CLAIMED LIENS WOULD 
NOT THEN ATTACH FOR THE REASON 
THAT THE FEE TITLE WAS NO LONGER 
IN THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR BUT HAD 
BECOME VESTED IN THE RESPONDENTS 
AND NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS P R O P E R AND 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Appellants claim the Court erred in so holding be-
cause the judgment was not satisfied and did not cease 
to be a lien upon the property in question for the reasons 
set out on pages 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17 of their Brief. Re-
spondents contend Appellants' reasons are without merit 
and will answer them in the order they appear in Appel-
lants' Brief. 
It must be noted that there is a presumption that 
the judgment of the trial court was correct and every 
reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of it; 
the burden of affirmatively showing error is on the party 
complaining thereof. Palfreyman v. Bates & Rogers Con-
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struction Co., et al., 108 Utah 142, 158 P. 2d 132 at 133; 
Wheat v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 
P. 2d 932 at 935; Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 122 Utah 360, 248 P. 2d 514 at 518. 
On page 13, paragraph 3 of their Brief, Appellants 
state Respondents' title to the property in question is 
subject to Appellants' claimed liens because Respondents 
Meeks got title by a Warranty Deed from the Judgment 
Debtor Jenkins after the Satisfaction of Judgment was 
vacated and therefore Respondents' title became subject 
to Appellants' liens. Respondents contend this claim of 
Appellants is ridiculous and without merit. That the 
referenced Deed is a nullity because Jenkins had no title 
to the property to convey on the date he executed that 
Warranty Deed, i.e. August 17, 1970 (Ex. TPP 21, p. 37) 
for the reason Jenkins had prior to that date conveyed the 
property to third parties Wallace J. Belnap and Carol C. 
Belnap, his wife, by Warranty Deed dated September 30, 
1969 and which was recorded March 17,1970 (Ex. TPP 21, 
p. 31) which was after the date the judgment was satisfied, 
i.e. December 31,1969 (Ex. TPP 21, p. 30) and prior to the 
date the Satisfaction of Judgment was vacated, i.e. May 
26, 1970 (Ex. TPP 21, p. 34). Also, the record clearly 
shows this is t/ie first time Appellants have made this 
claim in this case and they are barred from raising this 
contention for the first time on appeal. See Hamilton, 
et al. v. Salt Lake County Sewerage Improvement District 
No. 1, et aL, 15 U. 2d 216, 390 P. 2d 235; In Re Woodward, 
14 U. 2d 336, 384 P. 2d 110; Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 
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13 U. 2d 397, 375 P. 2d 456; Carson v. Douglas, 12 U. 2d 
424, 367 P. 2d 462; North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water 
& Irr. Co., et al., 118 Utah 600, 223 P. 2d 577; 5 Am. Jur. 
2d, Appeal and Error, Sec. 545, et seq. pp. 29, et seq. 
On Page 13, paragraph 4, Appellants claim that Re-
spondents hold title to the property subject to Appellants' 
claimed liens for the reason Belnaps apparently had notice 
of the liens because they gave a Quit Claim Deed to Re-
spondents recorded on March 17, 1970 (Ex. TPP 21, p. 
32) and all Belnaps could convey to Meeks: 
"Was what they had, and the fee title was not 
conveyed to Meeks, but was subject to any and 
all liens." 
Respondents contend this claim of Appellants is pre-
posterous, frivolous, sham and without merit for the rea-
sons the claim as set forth is ambiguous, unintelligible, not 
supported by the record and is contrary to law. Also the 
record clearly shows this is the first time the Appellants 
have made this claim in this case and they are barred 
from raising this contention for the first time on appeal. 
For authority see cases cited supra. On this point the 
Respondents also bring to the attention of this Court that 
under Sec. 57-1-3 UCA (1953) a fee simple title is pre-
sumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real 
estate unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser 
estate was intended. That no where in the Warranty 
Deed from Jenkins to Belnaps, or the Quit Claim Deed 
from Belnaps to Meeks is there notice a lesser estate was 
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intended. Also, on this point the Respondents bring to 
the attention of this Court that Appellants admitted 
during the proceedings that the chain of title to the prop-
erty was from the Jenkins to the Belnaps and then to 
the Respondents (R. 281, Ex. TPP 21, p. 31, 32). 
Appellants on page 13, paragraphs 5 and 6 of their 
Brief contend "There was always notice that plaintiff's 
attorney (Robbing) had a lien and that he had not satis-
fied the judgment." and stated that "The law is clear 
in the State of Utah. That parties cannot abrogate or 
disregard the attorney's lien." and cites Sec. 78-22-1 UCA 
(1953) in support thereof. Appellants on page 14, para-
graph 2 of their Brief contend "The attorney is the only 
one who can give a valid release of the lien." "That the 
release was not valid." "The release was not authorized" 
and cites Section 78-51-41 UCA (1953) and on page 16 
of their Brief cite URCP 58B (d) in support thereof. 
On the first point the Respondents admit there is 
no dispute that under Sec. 78-22-1 UCA (1953) a judg-
ment constitutes a lien upon the real property of the 
judgment debtor from the time a judgment against him 
is docketed. 
On the second point Respondents violently dispute 
that under Sec. 78-51-41 UCA (1953) the attorney for 
the judgment creditor is the only one who can give a valid 
release of the judgment lien and that the satisfaction in 
this case by the Credit Union was not valid because the 
satisfaction was not authorized by Robbins. On this 
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Point the Respondents bring to the attention of this 
Court that under URCP 58B (a) (2) which Appellants 
so noticeably omit from their Brief, not only can the at-
torney of record of the judgment creditor satisfy the judg-
ment but the owner thereof can satisfy the judgment, 
which in this case was the Credit Union, and under 
Rule 58B (d) which Appellants badly misquote and mis-
interpret on pages 16 and 17 of their Brief, the judgment 
was discharged and ceased to be a lien when the satisfac-
tion was entered upon the docket by the clerk, i.e.: 
RULE 58B SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Satisfaction by Owner or Attorney. A 
judgment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, 
as to any or all of the judgment debtors, by the 
owner thereof, or by the attorney of record of the 
judgment creditor where no assignment of the 
judgment has been filed and such attorney exe-
cutes such satisfaction within eight years after 
the entry of the judgment, in the following man-
ner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowl-
edged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by 
acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by 
the owner or attorney and entered on the docket 
of the judgment in the county where first dock-
eted, with the date affixed and witnessed by the 
clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judg-
ment, or as to one or more of the judgment debt-
ors, shall state the amount paid thereon or lor 
the release of such debtors, naming them. 
(d) Effect of Satisfaction. When a judg-
ment shall have been satisfied, in whole or in 
part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such 
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satisfaction entered upon the docket by the clerk, 
such judgment shall, to the extent of such sat-
isfactwn, be discharged and cease to be a lien 
Respondents submit that Rule 58B (a) (2) and (d) 
must be accepted at their face value, that the Rule speaks 
for itself, and under said Rule the owner of the judgment 
has the authority to satisfy the judgment. To say other-
wise would violate Rule 1 (a) of the URCP which provides 
as follows: 
Rule 1. General Provisions 
(a) Scope of Rules. These rules shall gov-
ern the procedure in the Supreme Court, the dis-
trict courts, city courts, and justice courts of 
the state of Utah, in all actions, suits and pro-
ceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at 
law or in equity, and in all special statutory 
proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. They 
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action. 
Respondents further submit that a fair examination 
of the Satisfaction of Judgment executed and filed by the 
Appellant Credit Union on December 31, 1969, con-
forms to URCP 58B (a) (2) (Ex. TPP 2„ R. 15). 
That the Satisfaction of Judgment was docketed by the 
Clerk as required by URCP 58B (c) (d) and the judg-
ment ceased to be a lien when so docketed (Ex. TPP 3, 
R. 284-287, 343-346). 
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Appellants on page 14, 15 and 16 of their Brief cite 
Petrie v. General Contracting Co., 17 U. 2d 408, 413 P. 
2d 600, Jefjries v. Third Judicial District Court, 63 P. 2d 
242, 90 U. 2d 525, Potter v. Ajax Mining Company, 19 
U. 421, 61 P. 999, to support their contention that Appel-
lant Credit Union and Defendant Jenkins could not abro-
gate or disregard Robbins' attorney lien and that the sat-
isfaction of the lien was not valid because Robbins is the 
only one who can give a valid satisfaction of the hen. 
Respondents contend that those cases are not applic-
able to the instant case because: (1) The Jeffries case 
was decided in 1936, approximately 15 years before the 
present URCP, were adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Utah and that case was between the original parties i.e. 
the Judgment Creditor for and on behalf of his attorney 
against the Judgment Debtor, whereas in the instant case 
the case is between the Credit Union, the Judgment Cred-
itor and Robbins, the Judgment Creditor's attorney, and 
the Respondents who are third parties and innocent pur-
chasers for value of real property from the judgment 
debtor at the time the judgment was satisfied and ceased 
to be a lien, without notice, actual or constructive. (2) 
That the Petrie case was decided in 1966, fifteen years 
after the adoption of the URCP but that case was be-
tween the original party plaintiff, the judgment creditor, 
and the original party plaintiff's attorney who enforced 
his attorney's lien against real property which was pro-
ceeds acquired by the judgment creditor from the judg-
ment debtor at Sheriff's Sale, which is not the same set 
of facts of the instant case. (3) That the Potter case was 
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decided in 1900, approximately 51 years before the pres-
ent URCP were adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah 
and that case was between the Judgment Creditor's at-
torney against the Judgment Debtor who was an original 
party to the action which is not the same set of facts as 
the instant case. All of the other cases cited by the Ap-
pellants on page 15 of their Brief appear to pre-date the 
adoption of the URCP by the Supreme Court of Utah and 
do not involve a BPP of real property. By reason thereof 
said cases are not applicable to the instant case. 
Appellants, on pages 16 and 17 of their Brief, claim 
that by reason of the decision rendered in the Potter v. 
Ajax Mining case, (supra), that URCP 5SB (d) and 
Section 78-51-41 UCA (1953), must be construed together. 
That by doing so "The Plaintiff is not the owner of the 
judgment until the attorney's lien is paid or discharged 
and the attorney is the only person who can give a valid 
Satisfaction until his lien is paid." 
Respondents dispute the Appellants' contention on 
this point and bring to the attention of this Court that 
there is no provision in URCP 58B (d) or Sec. 78-51-41, 
UCA 1953, that requires the two regulations to be con-
strued together. Respondents further bring to the 
attention of this Court that Potter v. Ajax constitutes no 
authority to uphold Appellants' contention on this point 
for the reasons that case was decided in 1900, 51 years 
prior to the adoption of the URCP and the facts of that 
case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the in-
stant case. In the Potter v. Ajax case, the court permitted 
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plaintiff's attorney to enforce his lien against the defen-
dant in the original case after setting aside a dismissal of 
the original case that was based upon a release and dis-
charge executed by the plaintiff and the defendant for 
the express purpose of cheating plaintiff's attorneys out 
of their compensation which Respondents submit has no 
similarity to the instant case before this court. 
Respondents offer no argument on the point that 
Respondents paid value for their house and lot because 
Appellants did not argue that point except to state the 
record clearly shows that Respondents paid the full pur-
chase price of $29,500.00 (R. 293, 294,295, Ex. TPP 6-13). 
Respondents offer no argument on the point there 
was no estoppel because Appellant did not submit argu-
ment on that point. However, Respondents bring to the 
attention of the Court that the record shows Rabbins 
filed an "Attorney's Claim for Lien" in the Salt Lake 
County Clerk's Office on May 14, 1970 (R. 19, Ex. TPP 
4) and Respondents claim the filing of this claim con-
stitutes an admission by Rabbins that the law required 
him to perf ect his lien against Respondents' property prior 
to the purchase thereof by Respondents by giving proper 
notice thereof. That such claim for attorney's lien was 
not adequate notice because it was not timely filed and it 
was not filed in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office 
whose records are customarily checked by abstractors 
when abstracting titles to real property and his failure to 
do so constitutes an estoppel. 
From the foregoing, it is abundantly clear Appellants 
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have failed to carry the burden to prove the claims as-
serted by them under Point I. of their Brief. 
POINT II. 
WHERE A T T O R N E Y CLAIMS A LIEN 
UPON LAND TO SECURE PAYMENT OF 
HIS FEE THAT IS NOT PART OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS, HE IS UNDER A DUTY 
TO PROTECT HIS LIEN AGAINST SUCH 
LAND BY TAKING STEPS TO MAKE THE 
RECORD THAT WOULD BE NOTICE TO 
ONE WHOSE DUTY IT IS TO INQUIRE 
ABOUT IT THAT SUCH LIEN EXISTED. 
THAT IF THE ATTORNEY FAILS TO TAKE 
STEPS TO MAKE SUCH RECORD AND 
AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE LITI-
GATION, THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR WHO 
OWNS THE LAND CONVEYS THE LEGAL 
TITLE TO A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR 
VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE LIEN, 
IT WILL NOT ATTACH TO THE LAND IN 
THE HANDS OF SUCH PURCHASER. 
Appellants on page 17 contend that McGhie Land 
Title Company and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation 
and their customer, the Meeks, were bound to take notice 
of the Appellant Robbins statutory lien under Section 
78-51-41 by reason of the Potter v. Ajax case, supra. Such 
claim is preposterous and ludicrous for the following 
reasons: 
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1. The judgment lien, the source of Robbins lien, 
was satisfied and discharged and ceased to be a lien on 
December 31,1969, until the satisfaction was vacated and 
the judgment reinstated on May 26, 1970. That the lien 
could not then attach because the title to the property 
was not owned by the judgment debtor but was then 
owned by the Respondents as was argued by the Respon-
dents under Point I of this Brief. 
2. The decision of the Potter v. Ajax case, is not 
applicable to the instant case because the facts in that 
case are not the same as the facts in the instant case, as 
pointed out in Respondents' argument under Point I. of 
this Brief. 
3. The facts of this case show the title companies 
were acting as the agent for the Belnaps in that the judg-
ment was satisfied and released on December 31, 1969 
by the filing of the Satisfaction of Judgment by Appel-
lants (R. 15); the lien of the judgment was discharged 
from the Respondents' property on December 31, 1969, 
the date the Satisfaction of Judgment was entered by the 
Clerk on the judgment docket, as required by Rule 58B 
(d) (Ex. TPP 3); Belnaps hired West Crest Realty to 
sell the property to Respondents (Ex. TPP 7, R. 38, 40); 
West Crest Realty negotiated the execution of the con-
tract between the Belnaps and the Respondents for the 
sale of the property as agents of the Belnaps (Ex. TPP 
6); Belnaps agreed to furnish Respondents with good 
and marketable title with abstract brought up-to-date or, 
at Belnap's option, a policy of title insurance in the name 
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of the Respondents (Ex. TPP 6) ; West Crest Realty as 
the agent for the Belnaps hired the title companies to 
provide the policy of title insurance they elected to furn-
ish to Respondents (Ex. TPP 16, R. 283, 284, 289, 290, 
291, 348, 349); Belnaps paid for the title policy (McDer-
maid deposition Ex. P. 10, Ex. TPP 16) and Belnaps paid 
West Crest Realty a real estate commission for handling 
the sale (McDermaid deposition Ex. P. 10). Respondents 
had nothing to do with the hiring of the title companies 
or the directing of their work. Meeks merely attended 
the closing and accepted a policy of title insurance insur-
ing them as the owners of fee title to the property, sub-
ject to the exceptions listed therein (Ex. TPP 16, R. 289, 
300). Therefore, any notice chargeable to the Title Com-
panies (which Respondents claim there was none) would 
be chargeable to Belnaps, or their agent West Crest 
Realty and not the Respondents. 
4. Respondents claim notwithstanding Sec. 78-51-
41 UCA 1953, that the courts generally hold that where 
the attorney claims a lien upon land that is not the sub-
ject of the litigation, to secure payment of his fee, the 
attorney is under a duty to perfect his lien against such 
land by taking steps to make the record that would be 
notice to one whose duty it is to inquire about it that 
such a lien existed; that if the attorney fails to take steps 
to make such record and after the termination of the liti-
gation, the judgment debtor who owns the land should 
convey the legal title to a purchaser who should acquire 
it in good faith and for value and without notice of the 
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lien, it will not attach to the land in the hands of such 
purchaser. 
For cases holding that notice is necessary to protect 
the Attorney's Lien against subsequent good faith pur-
chasers of land, see Miller v. Monroe, 50 Idaho 726, 300 
P. 362 (1931); Norton v. Mclninch, 50 U. 253,166 P. 984 
(1917); Victor Gold and Silver v. National Bank of the 
Republic, 18 U. 87, 55 P. 72 (1898); Charles v. Whitt, 
218 S. W. 994 (Kentucky) and 93 A. L. R. 695; 120 A. L. 
R. 1244, which cite the holdings of O'Brien v. Whitehead, 
75 Ga. 751 (1885); Dreyfuss v. Freud, 209 111. App. 345 
(1918); Gust v. Van Court, 74 Okla. 81 (1918), and others 
which recognize this principle of law. 
In the Idaho case, Miller v. Monroe, supra, the plain-
tiff's attorney attempted to enforce his attorney's lien un-
der Attorney's Lien Statute like Sec. 78-51-41 UCA 1953, 
against property that was subject to foreclosure action 
and that was sold at Sheriff's sale to a third party pur-
chaser. The Supreme Court of Idaho ruled against the 
attorney and stated: 
"Where an attorney's lien attaches to real 
property in this state to proceeds of a judgment 
procured by the attorney claiming the lien, it 
remains a lien against such real property until 
paid, or discharged, or the property passes into 
the hands of an innocent purchaser without no-
tice . . ." p. 364 
In the Utah case, Morton v. Mclninch, supra, the 
Supreme Court of Utah held the attorney by filing a No-
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tice of Claim of Lien in the County Recorder's Office in 
Millard County sufficed as notice to the judgment debtor. 
In the Utah case, Victor Gold and Silver v. National Bank 
of the Republic, supra, the Supreme Court of Utah stated 
that if an attorney claims compensation beyond cash costs 
under some agreement with his client, express or implied, 
his lien for such compensation can be protected against 
payment to the client by the judgment debtor only by 
notice to the judgment debtor. 
On this point Respondents incorporate by reference 
the next to the last paragraph under Point I. of this brief. 
I t is the general rule in the United States that a 
bona fide purchaser of a real estate title, perfect on its 
face, takes it discharged of all liens, encumbrances and 
restrictions of which he had no notice, such as liens, 
encumbrances and restrictions, prior mortgage, trust or 
an attorney's lien, that a bona fide purchaser is not charge-
able with the fraud of predecessors and takes title purged 
of any anterior fraud affecting it and from any equities 
existing between the original parties. See 92 C. J . S. P. 
330, Marleen v. Brown, 21 C. 2d 668, 134 P. 2d 770, Amer-
ican Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. Dowell, 31 Wash. 2d 
585, 198 P. 2d 191 and Miller v. Monroe, supra. 
For cases holding that where a judgment appears on 
the record to have been satisfied and discharged and upon 
reliance of such record a bona fide purchaser goes ahead 
and purchases property of the judgment debtor and the 
judgment creditor, under the prior satisfied judgment, 
attempts to set aside the prior satisfaction and regain 
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his priority, the subsequent bona fide purchaser is not 
bound by the prior judgment or lien where he has no 
notice other than the fact that the judgment had been 
satisfied. See McCormick v. Wheeler, 36 111. 114 (1865), 
where the Illinois Supreme Court stated: 
"Parties cannot be held to notice of what 
has no legal existence, and we would be going 
quite too far were we to hold them to notice of 
informal memoranda on the docket of the Judge 
by which the record might possibly, at some fu-
ture time be amended, and require them to act 
as if such amendment had been made." 
"In attempting to relate revival of the lien 
to the original hen there would not only be pulp-
able injustice as between these parties but the 
establishment of such a principle would grossly 
violate the public policy, by destroying faith in 
public records and in the security and impairing 
the security of titles." 
See also Van Sickle v. Harmeyer, alias William Allen, 
172 111. App. 218 (1901). The Supreme Court of Illinois 
held that: 
"The Decree of September 22, 1902 was a 
complete satisfaction and settlement of the ali-
mony decree of July 30,1901, and that decree so 
far as it provided for alimony stood released and 
discharged as of record. I t is well settled that an 
entry of a satisfaction of a judgment will not be 
vacated to the prejudice of a bona fide purchaser 
of property who became such while the judgment 
appeared by record to be satisfied and dis-
charged." 
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For similar cases holding as above, see Persons v. 
Shaeffer, 65 Cai. 79, 3 Pac. 94 (Calif. 1884) and Taylor 
v. Ranney, 4 HilL (N. Y.) 619, 1843). 
In the Persons v. Shaeffer case, the Supreme Court 
of the State of Calif, stated: 
"Equity might, under some circumstances, 
keep a lien alive, notwithstanding such discharge. 
But it certainly would not keep it alive to the 
prejudice of a party who had purchased the 
premises when it appeared of record that the lien 
had been discharged, and who did not have any 
knowledge of the equities on which a loan could 
be kept alive after being discharged." 
See also Guy v. Du Uprey, 16 Cal. 196, 76 Am. Dec. 
518 (1860), Bunn v. Lindsey, 95 Mo. 250, 7 S. W. 473 and 
Richards v. Griffith, 28 P. 484 (Calif. 1891), 92 Cal. 493. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS 
INTERVENTION AND INJUNCTION EN-
JOINING SALE OF RESPONDENTS' LAND 
AND PERMITTING RESPONDENTS TO 
PROVE THEIR TITLE TO THE LAND IN 
THE ORIGINAL CASE AND DENYING AP-
PELLANT'S MOTION TO JOIN TITLE 
COMPANIES AS DEFENDANTS. 
Appellants on pages 18 and 19 of their Brief claim 
"the Meeks, a subsequent buyer, should have not been 
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allowed to intervene in a suit between the plaintiff and 
defendant after judgment and after execution, regular on 
its face, has been levied upon the property which said 
property was owned by the debtor at the entry of judg-
ment." and to support their claim Appellant states the 
following: 
P. 18 
"That there is no rule or statute dealing with 
pleadings or relief after judgment other than 
Rule 60 which provides for relief from judgments 
or orders." "Section 60 states:" 
"On Motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice, re-
lieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order or proceeding for the fol-
lowing reasons * * * such as excusable ne-
glect." 
P. 19 
"The section which deals with execution and 
proceedings supplement thereto is Rule 69 and 
it provides: 
"ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION. Pro-
cess to enforce a judgment shall be by a Writ of 
Execution unless the court otherwise directs, 
which may issue at any time within eight years 
after the entry of judgment * * *" 
"We submit that this section does not allow the 
bringing of a distinct and separate cause of action 
by subsequent purchase against the plaintiff in 
the original action." 
to further support their contentions Appellant asserts: 
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P. 19 
"We maintain that neither the new rules nor the 
statute has changed, but the law has been for 
years that a third party not a party to the action 
in which the execution has issued, cannot inter-
vene in the original action." 
Respondents contend the claim of Appellants is not 
correct and bring to the attention of this court that a 
careful reading of Rule 60 and 69 URCP clearly shows 
there is no prohibition against the trial court granting 
intervention and injunction to Respondents under Rule 
24 URCP, which Rule Respondents contend controls this 
case. In fact, Rules 60 and 69, contrary to Appellant's 
contentions, grant to Respondents the right to obtain 
relief from judgment by motion or by an independent 
action and Rule 69 provides for a "Stay of Execution" 
pending such proceedings, i.e. See quotes from Rules 60, 
69 and 62 as follows: 
"Rule 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR 
ORDER. 
(b) M I S T A K E S; INADVERTENCE; 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; NEWLY DISCOV-
ERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC. On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or 
his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons . . . " 
"This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgment, order, proceeding or to 
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set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action." 
"Rule 69. EXECUTION AND PROCEED-
INGS SUPPLEMENTAL THERETO. 
(a) ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECU-
TION. Process to enforce a judgment shall be 
by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise 
directs . . . {except an execution may be stayed 
pursuant to Rule 62 either in the county in 
which such judgment was rendered, . . ." 
"Rule 62. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS TO EN-
FORCE A JUDGMENT. 
(b) STAY ON MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL OR JUDGMENT. In its discretion and 
on such conditions for the security of the adverse 
party as are proper, the court may stay the exe-
cution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judg-
ment pending the disposition of a motion for . . . 
or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order 
made pursuant to Rule 60. . . ." 
Respondents contend the last sentence of Rule 60, 
supra, above has reference to Rule 24. INTERVEN-
TION. That the following facts of record in this case are 
clearly sufficient to sustain the trial court's order grant-
ing intervention under Rule 24, injunction under Rule 62, 
supra, and the filing of a Third Party Complaint to enable 
Respondents to prove clear title to their house and lot, 
free and clear of the alleged liens of Appellants pursuant 
to Section 78-40-1 UCA 1953, namely. 
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RULE 24. INTERVENTION 
"(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon 
timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: . . . (2) when the repre-
sentation of the applicant's interest by existing 
parties is or may be inadequate and the appli-
cant is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated 
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or 
other disposition of property which is in the cus-
tody or subject to the control or disposition of 
the court or an officer thereof." 
"(b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. 
Upon timely application anyone may be per-
mitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when 
an applicant's claim or defense and the main 
action have a question of law or fact in common 
. . . In exercising its discretion the court shall 
consider whether the intervention will unduly 
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights 
of the original parties." 
"(c) PROCEDURE. A person desiring to 
intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon 
the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions 
shall state the grounds therefor and shall be ac-
companied by a pleading setting forth the claim 
or defense for which intervention is sought." 
Section 78-40-1. "ACTION TO DETERMINE 
ADVERSE CLAIM TO PROPERTY — AU-
THORIZED — An action may be brought by 
any person against another who claims an estate 
or interest in real property . . . for the purpose of 
determining such adverse claim." 
For instance Respondents contend: 
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(1) Respondents' application for intervention was 
timely filed in that they filed their Motion to Intervene 
on June 26, 1970, four days prior to June 30, 1970, date 
of Execution Sale and 23 days after Notice of Sale was 
posted on their house (R. 21-35, 47, 48, 49, 50) and Re-
spondents were part of the class entitled to make applica-
tion for intervention as required under Rule 24 (a) (b). 
(2) Appellants by executing upon Respondents' 
home were attempting to bind Respondents by the judg-
ment in the action against defendant Jenkins. That Jen-
kins' representation of Respondents' interests was inade-
quate because his whereabouts were unknown to Respon-
dents and Appellents (R. 16-20, Meeks deposition, p. 13, 
16, 17). That as owners of the house and lot Respon-
dents were so situated as to be adversely affected by 
the sale of their property which was in custody, or sub-
ject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer 
thereof, which clearly falls within the requirements of 
Rule 24 (a) (2) (3). 
(3) Respondents' claims and defenses to the alleged 
liens of Appellants involve a common question of law and 
fact, i.e. the existence of the alleged liens at the time Re-
spondents purchased their house and lot which dearly 
falls within the requirements of Rule 24 (b) (2). 
(4) Intervention did not prejudice the adjudica-
tion of the rights of the original parties to the action in 
that the purpose of the execution sale was solely to get 
money to satisfy Appellants' judgment which had already 
been entered and filed and Respondents posted bond to 
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make said payment in event Appellants could prove their 
alleged liens against Respondents' property, which does 
not violate the provision of the last sentence of Rule 24 
(b). 
Respondents complied with Rule 24 (c) by personal 
service of their Motion to Intervene upon both Appel-
lants, which motion stated the grounds therefore and was 
accompanied by a pleading, i.e. Motion for Relief from 
Judgment which set forth the claim and defenses for 
which intervention was sought (R. 28, 29, 30, 34, 35). 
Respondents cite the foliowing cases, holding the trial 
court had the prerogative to grant Respondents interven-
tion, injunction and the right to file the quiet title action 
in this proceeding. The Utah Supreme Court in the Utah 
cases Snow v. West, 35 U. 206, 99 P. 674; Young v. Schroe-
der, 10 U. 155, 172, 37 P. 252, affirmed 161 U. S. 334, 40 
L. Ed. 721, 16 S. Ct. 512; Post v. Foote, 18 U. 235, 54 P. 
975, adopted the rule followed by most states that a court 
has the power and jurisdiction over the execution of its 
own judgments and process and may set aside sales, where 
necessary. The Court even has the authority to set aside 
an execution sale after the time of redemption has ex-
pired, where such sale was attended by substantial irregu-
larities that results in a gross sacrifice of the judgment 
debtors' property. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the cases Pulsipher v. 
Chinn (Schmutz, Intervener), 69 U. 401, 225 P. 439 and 
White, et al. v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist. in 
and for Utah County, et al., 120 U. 173, 232 P. 2d 785, 
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adopted the rule followed by most of the states that if a 
third party has a right to restrain a judgment creditor 
from proceeding against his property, his remedy is a 
mere incidental proceeding in the case in which judgment 
was obtained, and not by a separate suit, especially if the 
property is within the jurisdiction of the court as is true 
in the instant case. 
In Pulsipher v. Chirm (Schmutz, Intervenor), supra, 
decided by this Court in 1927, the plaintiff Pulsipher ob-
tained confession of judgment against defendant Chinn 
on promissory notes. Prior to judgment plaintiff attached 
275 head of sheep in possession of defendant Chinn by 
writ of attachment. After judgment an order was entered 
permitting Intervenor Schmutz to intervene and to file 
a complaint in intervention which was later amended, 
whereby intervenor claimed ownership of the sheep and 
was entitled to immediate possession of said sheep. Plain-
tiff answered by denying such allegations and alleged the 
sheep were the property of defendant Chinn, that in any 
event Interveners' rights to the sheep were inferior to 
plaintiff under the writ of attachment. Intervenor was 
permitted to prove his title to the sheep and the court 
awarded ownership of the sheep to Intervenor by judg-
ment, free and clear of any claims of the plaintiff under 
the writ of attachment. 
In White, et al. v. District Court of Fourth Judicial 
District in and for Utah County, et al, decided by this 
Court in 1961, the Court held that the defendants Clara 
A. White and Kathryn Grange White could file Counter-
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claim against the plaintiff Clyde C. Lewis and Verona D. 
Lewis with respect to misrepresentation and fraud con-
cerning a contract of purchase of real property in the 
original case filed by the plaintiffs Lewis against the de-
fendants White for unlawful detainer. In reversing the 
decision of the trial court, who struck the counterclaim 
on grounds an action for misrepresentation and fraud 
could not be asserted in an action for unlawful detainer 
and held Whites' remedy was to bring a separate action. 
This Court stated; 
"Prior to the adoption of the New Rules of 
Civil Procedure that was the law of this state" 
citing Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 U. 398, 250 P. 982; 
Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 P. 206; Christy 
v. Guild, 101 U. 313,121 P. 2d 401. 
"This would be inconsistent with the spirit 
and purpose of the New Rules of Civil Procedure 
which was to simplify and expedite procedure 
and to consolidate litigation wherever that could 
be done without confusion or prejudice to the 
rights of litigants/' 
Respondents have not attempted to analyze the num-
erous authorities set forth on pages 19 to 23 of Appellants' 
Brief for the reason the authorities cited do not appear 
to include one Utah case and are consequently inapplic-
able to the situation under consideration. 
From the foregoing facts and authorities the trial 
court acted properly in exercising its right to grant to 
Respondents intervention, injunction and the right to 
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prove title to their property by a quiet title action in this 
proceeding. 
Respondents have not attempted to argue the point 
raised by Appellants that McGhie Land Title Company 
and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation should have 
been made parties to the action for the reason Appellants 
offer no arguments on that point, except in their conclu-
sion Appellants, in substance, say the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed because the Respondents 
have recourse against the title companies under the title 
insurance policy and the title companies were negligent 
in not checking the record and contacting Robbins to 
learn the status of Appellants' alleged liens. Respondents 
contend Appellants' claim is without merit and submit to 
this court that it is not unusual for a title insurer to refuse 
to pay spurious and invalid claims against a title they have 
insured and to assume the defense of an action filed to 
enforce such claims against the title for and on behalf of 
their insured as the title companies have done in this case. 
If title insurers did not resist such claims they would be-
come the victim of unconscionable claimants and not re-
main in business for any length of time. Respondents 
further claim that the existence of the policy of title insur-
ance does not change the law that is applicable to the 
satisfaction of the judgment and that the judgment ceased 
to be a lien at the time the satisfaction was entered on 
the judgment docket by the clerk and was not a lien 
until the judgment was reinstated. The judgment docket 
is a public record title companies and the general public 
rely upon to show the existence or non-existence of judg-
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CONCLUSION 
We submit to this honorable court that Appellants 
have failed to assert cogent and convincing authority or 
analysis in support of the questions at issue herein. On 
the basis of the authorities cited herein and the facts dis-
closed by the record, we respectfully submit Appellants' 
appeal should be dismissed and the judgment of the trial 
court affirmed on the grounds that: 
1. The satisfaction of judgment was valid. The 
judgment ceased to be a lien upon the satisfaction being 
entered upon the docket by the clerk under URCP 58B 
(d). 
2. Respondents became owners of the fee title to 
the property at a time the satisfaction of judgment was 
on file and before the satisfaction was vacated and the 
judgment reinstated; that the liens would not then attach 
for the reason the fee was no longer in the judgment 
debtor but was vested in Respondents. 
3. Respondents could rely on the record as it existed 
at the time of purchase and were bona fide purchasers 
for value and without notice, actual or constructive, of 
the purported liens of Appellants. 
4. Respondents' entitlements to intervention, in-
junction and to prove their title by a quiet title action 
were proper. 
5. The law applicable to each point raised by the 
Appellants is against the Appellants and in favor of the 
Respondents. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /-?. day of August, 1974 
...^/..... copies of the foregoing Answer Brief of Intervenors, 
Third Party Plaintiffs and Respondents were served upon 
Golden W. Robbins, attorney for plaintiff and third party 
defendants and appellant 705 Newhouse Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and upon William H. Henderson, attor-
ney for plaintiff and third party defendants and appel-
lant, 455 South 3rd East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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